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. Introduction roles of unknowns and uncertainty in emotional disorders. ThereThe current review and synthesis provides a contemporary
oundation for researchers and theorists working to understand the
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.0/).exist theoretical models that consider uncertainty as critical; but,
these models have typically focused on speciﬁc disorders or pathol-
ogy and few have distinguished deﬁnitions for fear of the unknown
and related constructs. The current review and synthesis offers such
delineations and integrates theoretical models of emotion, attach-
ment, and neuroticism, all of which converge to underscore the
importance of fear of the unknown, not only to psychopathology,
but to psychology.
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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Dispositional fear of the unknown is an individual’s propensity to
experience fear caused by the perceived absence of informationFig. 1. Relational map  of dictionary deﬁnitions.
. Fear of the unknown
An unknown is the perceived absence of information at any level
f consciousness. Per that deﬁnition, the unknown is a foundational
nd necessary core component of several closely related words
nd constructs such as uncertainty, novelty, unfamiliarity, and
trange (Carleton, 2012; Dictionaries, 2016; Dictionary.com, 2016).
ovecraft (1927) suggested “the oldest and strongest emotion of
ankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind of fear is fear of
he unknown” (as cited in (Joshi & Schultz, 2001; p. 255)). Similarly,
arleton, Sharpe and Asmundson (2007; p. 2314) argued that fear
f the unknown may  “be the most basic component of pathological
nxiety” and “a fundamental component of all anxiety disorders”.
he argument was brokered on prior research conducted with Intol-
rance of Uncertainty (IU; Andersen & Schwartz, 1992; Freeston,
héaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Krohne, 1989, 1993;
ruglansky, 1990).
Freeston et al. (1994 ﬁrst deﬁned IU as “a relatively broad con-
truct representing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions
o uncertainty in everyday life situations”. Despite the deﬁnition
f IU, neither intolerance nor uncertainty were explicitly deﬁned,
herein implying the dictionary deﬁnitions. Intolerance refers to
incapacity or indisposition to bear or endure” (“intolerant,” n.d.).
n unendurable stimulus would be aversive. When encountered
r anticipated, such a stimulus would be reasonably expected
o induce a negative emotional response (e.g., fear or anxiety).
ncertainty refers to experiencing an unknown (“uncertainty,”
.d.). Uncertainty is related to, but distinct from, ambiguity
Carleton, 2012; Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005), which
esults from features perceived as equivocal or perceived with
nsufﬁcient knowledge for a singular deﬁnitive interpretation (e.g.,
gure/ground images like the Rubin vase; apophenia). Disposi-
ional capacity to endure uncertainty is deﬁned by the interaction
nd the associated aggregate emotional response to the perceived
nknowns. Unknowns are internal percepts of absent informa-
ion (i.e., the perceived absence of information at any level of
onsciousness or processing); moreover, the dictionary deﬁnitions
or a variety of related terms appear dependent on deﬁnitions
f uncertainty and unknown (Fig. 1). Accordingly, despite sev-
ral redeﬁnitions since 1994 (see, for reviews, Birrell, Meares,
ilkinson, & Freeston, 2011; Carleton, 2012), I propose that IU
s an individual’s dispositional incapacity to endure the aversive
esponse triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or suf-
cient information, and sustained by the associated perception of
ncertainty.Disorders 39 (2016) 30–43 31
The deﬁnition of IU allows for distinguishing between the trig-
gering stimuli (i.e., an unknown), the response (i.e., fear of the
unknown), and the incapacity to endure that aversive (i.e., fearful)
response which is sustained by the associated perception of uncer-
tainty (i.e., IU), while recognizing the importance of distinguishing
between subjectively relevant and irrelevant information. The deﬁ-
nition also allows for distinctions between fear of the unknown, IU,
and each of the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural reﬂections of
that incapacity to endure. For example, some persons with high IU
might respond to unknowns and uncertainty by becoming cogni-
tively avoidant, some might ruminate, and others might engage in
substance abuse. In addition, Carleton’s (2012) suggestion that the
core of IU was an inherent, dispositional fear of the unknown ﬁts
well with the deﬁnition.
Carleton’s (2012) suggestion gave insufﬁcient consideration to
Barlow’s (2000) delineation of fear and anxiety, and an explicit deﬁ-
nition for fear of the unknown was  not provided; as such, providing
such considerations and deﬁnitions appear important next steps.
Barlow described anxiety as focused on threats that may  occur in
an unknowable future and contrasted that with fear, which focused
on present and imminent threats (Barlow, 2000). Barlow’s (2000)
distinction was  extended by Carleton (2012) who argued that a
person perceiving sufﬁcient knowns or agency when encounter-
ing a potential threat experiences either calm because there is no
threat or fear because the threat is being realized; however, the per-
son would not experience anxiety. The distinction is complicated
because unknowns are internal percepts of absent information
that necessarily occur in the present for the thinker; as such, an
unknown could simultaneously induce fear (i.e., the absence of
information is perceived as dangerous, present, and imminent) and
anxiety (i.e., the perceived absence is expected to continue and
alludes to one or more potential events that are uncertain, possibly
positive, but potentially negative).
To deﬁne fear of the unknown, the word fear will be used ﬂex-
ibly to describe an incremental range of physiological changes,
emotional intensities, and associated adjectives. For example, a
dog phobia might induce relatively little fear when thinking about
a dog (i.e., conjuring an internal percept), slightly more when
encountering a juvenile Pug, more still when encountering a Bor-
der Collie, intensity causing a panic attack and a ﬁght-or-ﬂight
response when encountering a Labrador, or paralyzing terror (i.e.,
tonic immobility—a nearly reﬂexive freezing response; Abrams,
Carleton, Taylor, & Asmundson, 2009) when encountering a Rot-
tweiler. Importantly, the intensity would be moderated by context
(i.e., the objective and subjective aggregation of salient and key
knowns and unknowns). For example, encountering a sleeping and
caged Rottweiler would likely evoke a very different emotional
intensity than encountering an enraged and charging Rottweiler.
The distinction assumes, in part, perceived certainty that the
dog is actually asleep and the cage is sufﬁciently secure. Across
the encounters the emotional experience could be very broadly
described as “fear”; however, the different intensities would likely
involve different intensities of physiological activation and be
described by different adjectives. For example, a low intensity
might be described as dislike or bother; a moderate intensity might
be described as fear or intolerance; a high intensity might be
described as terror or dread. In this deﬁnition, fear is not consid-
ered an absolute dichotomous state (i.e., entirely experienced as
paralyzing terror or entirely experienced as absent), but rather as
a continuum.
The deﬁnitions offered for unknown, IU, and contextualized fear,
provide important foundations for deﬁning fear of the unknown.at any level of consciousness or point of processing. Considering
Mahoney and McEvoy’s (2012b) astute distinction between trait
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nd state IU, a similar distinction is offered for fear of the unknown.
he propensity (i.e., trait fear of the unknown), measured at any
oint in time, would be a function of inherent disposition pri-
arily inﬂuenced by long-standing experience (i.e., learning) and
uanced by situational factors during measurement. In contrast,
he intensity of a current emotional experience (i.e., state fear of the
nknown) would be speciﬁc, having been inﬂuenced by both trait
evels and situational factors during measurement. Dispositional IU
eﬂects the incapacity to endure the aversive (i.e., fearful) response
riggered by the perception of one or more salient or key unknowns
nd sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty. The
eﬁnitions make for subtle, but potentially critical, distinctions
etween two highly related constructs, with fear of the unknown
eing lower-order relative to IU. Furthermore, both constructs can
nd should be distinguished from the expected consequences (e.g.,
rustration; loss; harm) as well as the cognitive (e.g., worry; disor-
anization) and behavioural responses (e.g., information seeking;
naction) caused by fear of the unknown and IU.
Fearing the unknown and IU could profoundly inﬂuence
erceptions and desires for predictability and controllability. Pre-
iction and control are sought to affect consequences, presumably
educing aversive consequences and increasing appetitive ones.
redictability involves probabilistic assessments of an event occur-
ing, the timing of an event, the location of an event, and/or the
ntensity of an event (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Accordingly, the
onstruct is necessarily premised on a balance between perceived
nowns and unknowns. For example, a person may  perceive the
nﬂuence of gravity as known and with that make a prediction
bout skydiving; however, the prediction would likely change as
 function of perceiving unknowns, such as the quality of a speciﬁc
arachute. The desire for predictability would then be inﬂuenced
ot only by expected possible consequences (e.g., death), but by the
umber of unknowns and reactions to those unknowns.
A desire for predictability presumes a desire for controllabil-
ty. Controllability involves believing with sufﬁcient certainty that
vailable resources can inﬂuence the aversiveness of an event
Thompson, 1981), which accords with notions of agency and self-
fﬁcacy (Bandura, 1977, 1989, 1997); indeed, the level, strength,
nd generality of self-efﬁcacy varies based on perceptions of
ertainty and therein predictability and controllability (Bandura,
977). Bandura’s concepts of agency and self-efﬁcacy describe the
erceived capacity to predict and control consequences (Bandura,
977, 1989, 1997). Perceived agency or self-efﬁcacy necessarily
equires several knowns and is necessarily mitigated by the pres-
nce of unknowns and the experience of uncertainty. Bandura
1977) described outcome expectancy as the estimation that a
iven behaviour will lead to certain outcomes. By extension, he
escribed efﬁcacy expectation as the level of certainty the required
ehavior can be successfully produced (Bandura, 1977). Unknowns
ecessarily reduce capacity for prediction and control, facilitating
ear (Armﬁeld, 2006), and compromising agency and self-efﬁcacy
Bandura, 1997). Accordingly, attempts to increase perceived pre-
ictability and controllability serve as coping responses for fear
f the unknown and IU, as well as efforts to mitigate poten-
ially aversive consequences. In the skydiving example, fear of the
nknown could produce signiﬁcant behavioural changes favouring
ncreased control (e.g., taking a second parachute), predictabil-
ty (e.g., researching parachute failure probabilities), and certainty
e.g., not jumping) regarding a desired consequence (e.g., survival).
uch behavioural changes reﬂect attempts to mitigate or eliminate
ear of the unknown, as well as to facilitate tolerance (i.e., reduce
U) for the associated and inescapable uncertainty associated with
kydiving.
An individual would be best equipped to succeed when
nknowns are encountered in sufﬁciently predictable and con-
rollable contexts, therein facilitating positive responses, such asDisorders 39 (2016) 30–43
curiosity (Berg & Sternberg, 1985); however, “implicit in this under-
standing of curiosity is that people must feel [i.e., believe with
sufﬁcient certainty] they have the ability to effectively cope with
or make sense of the novelty, ambiguity and uncertainty being
confronted during explorations” (Kashdan et al., 2009). Indeed,
perceiving an unknown as positive reasonably requires the percep-
tion to occur in the context of sufﬁcient knowns associated with
safety. As unknowns increase, compromising predictability, con-
trol, and efﬁcacy, a variety of emotional and behavioural responses
can be potentiated. Accordingly, understanding the role fear of the
unknown plays in contemporary models of emotion, attachment,
inhibition, temperament, anxiety, and neuroticism may  be critical
for psychology.
3. Fear of the unknown and emotions
There is currently no deﬁnitively accepted deﬁnition or model
for emotion (Gross & Barrett, 2011; Moors, 2009; Mulligan &
Scherer, 2012; Scherer, 2005); however, there appear to be some
generally accepted elements for a deﬁnition. Mulligan and Scherer
(2012) proposed a partial deﬁnition for emotion that draws on the
recent evolution of, and overlap across, emotion models (Gross &
Barrett, 2011; Moors, 2009): an emotion (1) is time limited, (2) is
triggered by at least one appraisal, (3) is guided by at least one
appraisal, (4) contains bodily changes (e.g., arousal) that are felt,
and (5) involves a perceptual or intellectual episode. The deﬁnition
favours theories of emotion wherein appraisal – as a component, a
direct process, a recursive process, and an outcome – is considered
causally central to emotion (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda,
2013). The contemporary models also overlap (Gross & Barrett,
2011; Moors, 2009), with particular regards to causality (Moors,
2009; Moors et al., 2013). For example, most emotion models posit
cognitive processes as playing a key role that is typically antecedent
and initially unconscious or automatic. Most emotion models also
include a key role for somatic components, behaviours, and goals
or perceived consequences. The relative inﬂuence and order of the
process components remains debated, with evidence of an evolu-
tion towards automatic, perceptual, and parallel processing (Moors,
2009).
Scherer (2013) suggests the emotion process occurs in four
sequential categories, each category containing a series of sequen-
tial and cumulative “checks” for appraising a stimulus. The checks
in each sequential category can be processed simultaneously,
interactively, and with recursive feedback across all categories
(see Scherer, 2013). The ﬁrst sequential category is called rele-
vance. The ﬁrst check (i.e., lowest-order, fundamental, basic) in
the relevance category evaluates whether the stimulus is “sudden,
familiar, unpredictable” (p. 151) or, more succinctly, “unknown”
(see Scherer, 2013). The second check evaluates whether the stim-
ulus is aversive or appetitive. The third check evaluates whether
the stimulus is relevant to goals or needs. The second sequen-
tial category is called implications and consequences, and has a
series of checks that evaluate causal attribution, outcome prob-
ability, discrepancy from expectations, goal/need conduciveness,
and urgency. The third sequential category is called coping poten-
tial, and has a series of checks that evaluate of control, power, and
adjustment. The fourth and ﬁnal category (i.e., highest-order) is
called norm compatibility, and has a series of checks that evaluate
internal and external standards (e.g., self-ideals and social norms,
respectively).
The check for unknowns in Scherer’s (2013) ﬁrst sequential
category is processed at four levels that interact continuously to
produce top-down and bottom-up effects (Scherer, 2009): (1) low-
level neural substrates (i.e., mostly genetically determined; criteria
consist of templates for pattern matching; includes notions of
biological preparedness); (2) fairly automatic schematic memory
xiety 
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races; (3) automatic or deliberate associations involving cortical
reas; and (4) conceptual cortical areas involving propositional
nowledge, cultural meanings, and effortful conscious process-
ng. Appraisals occur at each of the four levels and check for
nknowns, placing substantial and pervasive importance ﬁrst on
dentifying unknowns and second on the causal impact of per-
eiving unknowns for emotion (Sacharin, Sander, & Scherer, 2012;
cherer, 2009). Therefore, responses to unknowns appear to be
ritical deﬁning elements for any emotion.
An emotional experience will necessarily be determined by
ppraising the balance between knowns and unknowns in any
iven situation, as well as the learned predicted consequences
Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013; Gray
 McNaughton, 2003; Kagan & Snidman, 2004; Scherer, 2009)
nd perceived security (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978;
owlby, 1973, 1989; van Ijzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988). Con-
ider a person who is having a birthday and has been presented
 box with unknown contents by person known to be appetitive
e.g., a close friend) who  is demonstrating behaviours known to be
ssociated with appetitive outcomes (e.g., smiling). In such a cir-
umstance the unknown contents of the box are likely expected, on
he whole, to be appetitive and facilitate a positive emotional expe-
ience (e.g., surprise). Consider instead the climatic scene from the
ovie Seven, where a person who is not having a birthday has been
resented a box with unknown contents by a person known to be
versive, and that presenter is demonstrating behaviours known
o be associated with aversive outcomes (e.g., creepily describing
aving access to a vulnerable family member). In this case, the
nknown contents are likely expected, on the whole, to be aversive
nd facilitate a negative emotional experience (e.g., anger, fear).
he knowns and unknowns critically determine the overall emo-
ional experience, even though both situations describe a box with
nknown contents. Similarly, an unknown (e.g.,  to the 10th dec-
mal place) that becomes known as not aversive or as irrelevant
e.g., not on the up and coming exam) will also not produce fear.
In short, different knowns will differentially impact the inﬂu-
nce of different unknowns based on individual context, salience,
nd experience; as such, there is an inﬁnite number of possible
peciﬁc combinations wherein unknowns could be perceived as
versive, making individual reactivity to unknowns in general (i.e.,
ear of the unknown) and incapacity to endure that reactivity (i.e.,
U) critical for understanding emotional responses. For example, a
erson may  accept as known that an event will happen, that they
now what to do when it happens, and that they are skilled enough
o respond as needed, and yet still not know when it will happen. In
ontrast, a person may  not know if something will happen, yet still
now when it would happen if it does, what to do when it happens,
nd that they are skilled enough to respond as needed. Both sce-
arios have the same number of known and unknown elements,
ut may  produce very different emotional responses depending on
ndividual context, salience, and experience, as well as fear of the
nknown and IU.
There is also a potentially critical interactive relationship
etween emotional responses (e.g., fear) to stimuli (e.g., unknowns)
nd affective personality traits or emotional dispositions (e.g., neu-
oticism; Scherer & Brosch, 2009); speciﬁcally, “(a) an emotion
isposition (trait affect) is a risk factor for experiencing certain
motions more readily and/or more frequently, (b) appraisal bias
ends to cause certain emotions to be more readily experienced
nd may  thus lead to the emergence of emotion dispositions and
ven emotional disturbances and (c) cultural goal, belief and value
ystems may  encourage certain types of appraisal bias and may
hus provide an explanation for vestiges of culture-speciﬁc modal
ersonality” (p. 265). By extension, if responses to unknowns are
eﬁning elements of emotion, and if there is an appraisal bias
or unknowns that facilitates fear, that bias should be reﬂected asDisorders 39 (2016) 30–43 33
important for existing models of attachment and temperament, as
well as clinically-signiﬁcant anxiety and depression.
4. Fear of the unknown and attachment
Parent–child attachment has long been “related to separation
anxiety (see Bowlby, 1960), fear of the strange and strangers
(Morgan & Ricciuti, 1969; Schaffer, 1966), and engaging in explo-
ration” (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; p. 50). Broadly speaking, there
are four categories used to describe the quality of attachment
between a parent and a child: secure, insecure avoidant, inse-
cure ambivalent, and insecure disorganized (Ainsworth et al., 1978;
Main & Solomon, 1990). Children who perceive certainty and pre-
dictability in the provision of safety from their parents are more
likely to be securely attached. Importantly, insecure attachments
facilitate internal working models based on negative expectations
(Bowlby, 1989) and are nonspeciﬁc risk factors for psychopathol-
ogy (Brumariu & Kerns, 2010; Fearon, Bakermans-Kranenburg,
van IJzendoorn, Lapsley, & Roisman, 2010; Groh, Roisman, van
IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Fearon, 2012; Madigan,
Atkinson, Laurin, & Benoit, 2013), as well as symptoms of anxi-
ety and anxiety sensitivity (see Brumariu & Kerns, 2010; Colonnesi
et al., 2011; Madigan et al., 2013).
The Strange Situation (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970) is among the
most recognized behavioural assessment protocols for catego-
rizing attachment (Main & Solomon, 1990; van Ijzendoorn &
Kroonenberg, 1988). The Strange Situation places the child into a
controlled but uncertain situation (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970) that
allows researchers to study attachment and exploratory behaviours
as inﬂuenced by unknowns (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). Bowlby
(1973) explicitly noted an attempt to balance the unknowns such
that the situation would be interesting rather than frightening,
implying the researchers already new the infants were likely to
fear unknowns. Indeed, they knew the infant would display intense
distress when encountering unknown people or events in the an
absence of mothering; moreover, changes in noise, illumination,
movement, or the presentation of other unknowns or uncertainty
produced fear with “little or no learning” (Bowlby, 1973, p. 114).
In the Strange Situation, their intent was  to observe how well the
presence of a signiﬁcant known (i.e., the mother) would mediate the
infant’s fear of the unknown (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). Their results
underscored that children ﬁnd unknowns, particularly approaching
unknowns, extremely frightening and approach (Bowlby, 1973).
Research into attachment appears to underscore an important
role for unknowns, uncertainty, novelty, and strange situations
or strange stimuli. Secure attachment appears premised on per-
ceiving parental ﬁgures as knowns that are certain to be safe.
Thereafter, secure attachment appears to mitigate fear experienced
when encountering subsequent unknowns. Interactions between
parental attachment, behavioural inhibition, and temperament can
predict anxiety symptoms (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; Bowlby, 1973;
Colonnesi et al., 2011; Degnan & Fox, 2007; Lewis-Morrarty et al.,
in press; Madigan et al., 2013); as such, the role of unknowns for
behavioural inhibition and temperament may  also be important.
Indeed, fear of the unknown appears to have broad important impli-
cations for children and adolescents disorders as has recently been
demonstrated within autism research (Boulter, Freeston, South,
& Rodgers, 2014; Hodgson, Freeston, Honey, & Rodgers, 2016;
Uljarevic, Carrington, & Leekam, 2016).
5. Fear of the unknown and the behavioural inhibition
systemThe behavioural inhibition system (BIS) was derived from learn-
ing models based on experimental results with non-human animals
(Gray, 1976; Gray & McNaughton, 2003). The system describes
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eurobiological foundations for behavioural inhibition, risk assess-
ent, increased vigilance, and increased arousal. Those increases
re attributed to stimuli associated with pain, loss, and unknowns
Gray & McNaughton, 2003). The BIS speaks directly to neurobio-
ogical underpinnings associated with fear and anxiety, such that
anxiety represents activity in the behavioural inhibition system”
Gray & McNaughton, 2003; p. 45).
The BIS functions as a mechanism for comparisons that is con-
ruent with the appraisal processes described by Scherer (2009).
he comparisons include any combination of stimuli, predictions,
oals, and memory. When there is a mismatch (i.e., an unknown)
r a perceived threat (i.e., an aversive known), the BIS is activated
n an incremental recursive fashion (Gray & McNaughton, 2003).
ndeed, Gray and McNaughton (2003) argue that unknowns are, and
hould be, treated as potential threats that innately produce fear
nd anxiety; however, they argue that unknowns are simultane-
usly considered aversive and potentially appetitive. The perceived
bsent information then becomes salient, key, or insufﬁcient based
n a balance of knowns. Contextual differences, including the rel-
tive balance between perceived knowns and unknowns in any
iven situation, whether an unknown is salient or key, and whether
nowns are sufﬁcient, dramatically inﬂuence whether an unknown
s appraised as probabilistically aversive or appetitive and, there-
fter, capacity to endure the subsequent uncertainty. The process
avours aversive predictions (Gray & McNaughton, 2003) such that
ny check for novelty that identiﬁes an unknown in the emotion
rocess (Scherer, 2013) incrementally activates the BIS, facilitat-
ng fear and anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2003). Sensory stimuli
dentiﬁed as unknown are rapidly sent to the amygdala, but unless
omething happens to further evidence the unknown as threaten-
ng, habituation also occurs rapidly (Gray & McNaughton, 2003).
n other words, unknowns are initially perceived as aversive, acti-
ate the BIS, and facilitate fear; but without reinforcement that the
nknown is, or leads to, an aversive consequence, the appraisal
ecomes neutral and then appetitive.
The neurobiological foundations for the BIS draw heavily on
xperimental work (e.g., Aggleton, 1993; Davis, 2002; LeDoux,
996), demonstrating the importance of uncertainty for the amyg-
ala and associated structures. The structures all support the
evelopment of non-speciﬁc attention or arousal, which manifests
n several conditioned responses that enhance sensory processing
Kapp, Whalen, Supple, & Pascoe, 1992). The conditioning is posited
s very rapid and based on inherent plasticity of the structures
hen stimuli are perceived as unknown (Kapp et al., 1992). Encoun-
ers with unknowns appear preferentially remembered (Hastie,
984) and likely to induce sustained neuronal activity in the amyg-
ala irrespective of motivation (Herry et al., 2007; Jackson, Nelson,
 Proudﬁt, 2015). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of neu-
oimaging studies implicated uncertainty as increasing heart rate
ariability as well as activation of the amygdala and ventromedial
refrontal cortex (Thayer, Ahs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012).
The BIS arguably reﬂects or describes temperament, which
s considered a cluster of heritable emotional and behavioural
esponses (Kagan & Snidman, 2004). In line with the BIS, Kagan and
nidman (2004 suggest temperament is characterized by two cat-
gories based on children’s reactions to unknowns: “inhibited and
ninhibited to the unfamiliar”. The key discriminating behaviour
or the two categories is what extent the child displays fear when
ncountering an unknown (Kagan & Snidman, 2004; p. 14); indeed,
earful responses to unknowns at 4 months of age can predict
ehavioural inhibition at 14 months of age (e.g., Moehler et al.,
008).A recent neurobiological review has also underscored a cen-
ral role for fear of the unknown that parallels descriptions of
he BIS (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). The review offered an inte-
rated neurological model called the Uncertainty and AnticipationDisorders 39 (2016) 30–43
Model of Anxiety (UAMA), the details of which are beyond the
scope of the current review and synthesis. In brief, the authors
begin by conceptualizing anxiety “as anticipatory affective, cog-
nitive and behavioural changes in response to uncertainty about a
potential future threat” (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; p. 489). There-
after, the UAMA describes consequentially negative interactions
with uncertainty as facilitating maladaptive responses includ-
ing increased estimates of threat, hypervigilance, and avoidance
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). The UAMA presents a neurologically-
based model, supported by empirical evidence, that emphasizes
BIS activation to unknowns (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). The avail-
able evidence suggests unknowns increase physiological responses
to threat (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013;
Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008; Thayer et al., 2012) and produce sustained
increases in the amygdala and the hippocampus of humans (Herry
et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2015). There is also evidence of neu-
ral encoding and mechanisms dedicated to processing unknowns
(Bach & Dolan, 2012), including evidence that startle potentiation
may  depend on the presence of uncertainty (Nelson & Shankman,
2011). Indeed, recent behavioural evidence suggests an important
interaction between threat perception and IU (Reuman, Jacoby,
Fabricant, Herring, & Abramowitz, 2015). Despite the impressive
contributions to understanding neural correlates of uncertainty,
there is also substantial need for additional research to clarify the
relationships between the neural bases, individual perceptions, and
clinical presentations (Wever, Smeets, & Sternheim, 2015).
Riskind (1997) and Riskind, Rector and Taylor (2012) have pro-
posed a Looming Vulnerability model wherein BIS activation is
associated with a cognitive bias to exaggerate the perception of
threat associated with approaching stimuli called Looming Cog-
nitive Style. The bias results from a perceived narrowing of the
distance in space associated with an approaching visual object
or sound source, which then produces arousal in humans (Ball
& Tronick, 1971; Kayed & Van der Meer, 2007) and other ani-
mals (Millot, Bégout, & Chatain, 2009). Looming cognitive style
has been positively related to anxiety disorders (Riskind, Rector,
& Casssin, 2011) and inversely related to depression (Riskind,
Kleiman, Seifritz, & Neuhoff, 2014). The construct itself is also
in accord with the aforementioned results from Bowlby and col-
leagues (e.g., Bowlby, 1973) that indicated children ﬁnd unknowns,
particularly approaching unknowns, extremely frightening.
Despite the potential of looming, cognitive appraisals associated
with looming would likely remain critical, even if that appraisal
was primarily occurring at automatic levels per Scherer’s model
(Scherer, 2009, 2013). A rapidly approaching unknown may  very
reasonably be appraised as threatening, particularly depending on
context; in contrast, a rapidly approaching known percept in the
appropriate context might be appraised quite differently. For exam-
ple, an unknown dark object rapidly approaching a person’s head
in an unfamiliar forest at twilight might well facilitate fear; in con-
trast, a baseball rapidly approaching a highly skilled player about
to win the World Series is unlikely to facilitate fear.
Exposure to unknowns appears to be causally related to BIS acti-
vation, inhibition, and temperament. Kagan and Snidman (2004)
suggested their temperament categories (i.e., inhibited and unin-
hibited to the unfamiliar) have also been called reﬂective and
impulsive, high-reactive and low-reactive, or introverted and
extraverted, respectively. Barlow and colleagues extended this
relabeling by describing “two genetically based core dimensions of
temperament: neuroticism and, to a lesser degree, extraversion. . .
these traits have received various labels, including negative affect,
behavioral inhibition, trait anxiety, and harm avoidance as alternate
terms for neuroticism and positive affect or behavioral activation
as alternate terms for extraversion” (Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl,
Bullis, & Ellard, 2014, p. 347). Clark and Beck (2010 similarly argued
that trait anxiety is “. . .so closely related to negative emotionality
R.N. Carleton / Journal of Anxiety 
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i.e., Neuroticism or Negative Affect) that the two are considered
lmost synonymous”. Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis and Carl
2014, p. 481) went on to describe neuroticism as “a dimension of
emperament marked by.  . .the tendency to experience frequent,
ntense negative emotions associated with a sense of uncontrolla-
ility (the perception of inadequate coping) in response to stress”
Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014, p. 481). In doing so, Clark, Beck, Barlow,
nd colleagues have made several higher-order constructs associ-
ted with anxiety and related psychopathology nearly equivalent
o each other and to BIS processes, as well as emphasizing the role
f responses to unknowns. Accordingly, responses to unknowns
cross different levels of conscious processing appear to be the most
asic component not only of IU, but also of neuroticism (and therein
he aforementioned related constructs such as negative affect and
rait anxiety), and serve as a key trigger for the BIS activation or ana-
ogue thereof (see Fig. 2). To that end, the implicit importance for
ear of the unknown has been further explicated in more detailed
iscussions of their anxiety models.
. Fear of the unknown and anxiety models
There are two particularly prevalent contemporary models for
escribing psychopathology related to fear and anxiety; speciﬁ-
ally, the Cognitive Model of anxiety (Clark & Beck, 2010) and the
riple Vulnerability Model of anxiety (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014;
arlow, Sauer-Zavala et al., 2014). In addition, the Tripartite and
ntegrative Hierarchical Models (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka,
atson, & Clark, 1998) are designed to explain the clinically appar-
nt overlap between anxiety and depression as described by the
ognitive Model. There are also a vast number of other models
hat focus on one or more speciﬁc disorders (e.g., generalized anxi-
ty disorder; panic disorder; posttraumatic stress disorder; see for
xamples, Antony and Stein, 2009; Stein, Hollander, & Rothbaum,
010); however, the speciﬁc models typically overlap with the gen-
ral ones, as well as contemporary models of emotion (Moors, 2009;
oors et al., 2013; Scherer, 2013).
.1. The Cognitive Model of anxiety
The Cognitive Model of anxiety (Clark & Beck, 2010) describes
ear as an automatic appraisal of stimuli as imminently threatening
r dangerous; in contrast, anxiety is described as the enduring sub-
ective response to having experienced fear. Relative to fear, anxiety
s considered a more complex response to situations known to be
versive or to unknown situations. As such, fear is posited as the
asic process that underlies anxiety and therein all anxiety disor-
ers. Like appraisal models of emotion (Moors et al., 2013; Scherer,Disorders 39 (2016) 30–43 35
2009, 2013), the Cognitive Model (Clark & Beck, 2010) is sequential
with recursive feedback and begins with appraisal of a stimulus.
A stimulus is ﬁrst appraised as relevant or not in an orienting
mode. The orienting mode is preconscious and automatic, iden-
tifying stimuli as negative, positive, or neutral by comparing the
stimuli to knowns in memory, and then redirecting attention
based on personal relevance. If the percept is identiﬁed as nega-
tive, a primal threat mode activation occurs, activating in parallel
several basic evolutionarily schemas (i.e., cognitive-conceptual,
behavioural, physiological, motivational, affective) that are rigid,
automatic, and hypervalent, designed to maximize safety and min-
imize danger. The cognitive-conceptual schemas involve selection,
storage, retrieval, and interpretation of threat-related information.
The behavioural schemas involve mobilization and evaluation of
early defensive responses (e.g., ﬁght-or-ﬂight). The physiological
schemas appear similar to the BIS (Gray & McNaughton, 2003)
and involve autonomic nervous system function and prioritized
processing of proprioceptive stimuli; speciﬁcally, primal threat
mode activation involves increased autonomic arousal, defensive
inhibitory responses (e.g., escape, avoidance, freezing), cognitive
processing errors (e.g., underestimates of coping capacity, focus
on inability, unsupported catastrophic thoughts), and automatic
threat-relevant thoughts (e.g., involuntary thoughts and images
of danger). The motivational schemas involve rules for avoid-
ing threat, reducing unpredictability and therein unknowns, and
reducing aversiveness. The affective schemas involve the conscious
perception of emotion as a subjective feeling that can be metacog-
nitively assessed and described.
The primal threat mode activation is followed by a secondary
elaboration and reappraisal process that occurs much more slowly,
moderating the intensity of fear and anxiety depending on several
factors that interact with the primal threat mode activation. An
evaluation of coping resources and skills is a key factor, the efﬁcacy
of which can be critically compromised by unknowns (Clark & Beck,
2010). The secondary process involves searching for known safety
cues to reduce short-term anxiety; however, safety cue dependence
can exacerbate threat perception when the cues are known to be
absent. Threats perceived during the secondary process feed back
into the orienting mode, escalating or deescalating fear and anxi-
ety. Persons with anxiety-related pathology are thought to have a
bias associated with identifying negative stimuli that facilitates the
primal threat mode activation. Furthermore, such persons are also
thought to have biases impacting the secondary process, reduc-
ing efﬁcacy, increasing safety cue dependence, disrupting problem
solving, facilitating uncontrolled threat-oriented worry, and mag-
nifying threat assessments.
6.2. Triple Vulnerability Model
The Triple Vulnerability Model (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014)
builds on Barlow’s (2002) and Barlow, Sauer-Zavala et al. (2014)
delineation of fear and anxiety, underscoring the causal impact of
uncertainty for anxiety (Boswell et al., 2013). Barlow and colleagues
deﬁne anxiety as an inferred construct involving physiological,
behavioural, and cognitive components that are activated by the
perception of unknowns and the experience of uncertainty. The
Triple Vulnerability Model was designed as an integrative theory
to understand the biological and environmental facets underling
the development of neuroticism. Like the appraisal models (Moors
et al., 2013; Scherer, 2009, 2013) and the Cognitive Model (Clark
& Beck, 2010), the Triple Vulnerability Model is sequential with
recursive feedback.The Triple Vulnerability Model (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014)
describes three interacting vulnerabilities that are activated by
encounters with unknowns (Boswell et al., 2013): (1) “a general
biological (heritable) vulnerability”; (2) “a general psychological
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ulnerability consisting of a heightened sense of unpredictabil-
ty and uncontrollability and associated changes in brain function
esulting from early adverse experience”; and (3) “a more speciﬁc
sychological vulnerability – also largely learned – accounting for
hy one particular emotional disorder (e.g., panic disorder) may
merge instead of another (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder)”.
The general biological vulnerability involves the heritable and
eurobiological facets underlying personality or temperament
Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014) that generally align with those in the
IS (Gray & McNaughton, 2003). There is also growing neurolog-
cal evidence (e.g., Lanius et al., 2010) in line with the emotion
iterature (Scherer & Brosch, 2009) that repeated activation of the
IS is sensitizing and even potentiating, leading to hypervigilance
nd increased threat reactivity (Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014), all of
hich increases neuroticism; however, biological inﬂuence is con-
idered insufﬁcient to cause of anxiety-related pathology without
erceptions of stressors as unpredictable or uncontrollable. The
eneral psychological vulnerability involves pervasive acceptance
hat life events are unpredictable and uncontrollable, and that the
ndividual has insufﬁcient resources to cope with negative events
Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014). Persons who have emotional disor-
ers are thought to be more fearful of unknowns, less tolerant of
ncertainty, and more dependent on controllability, all of which
lso increases neuroticism (Barlow, Sauer-Zavala et al., 2014).
Barlow, Ellard et al. (2014 indicate the general biological and
sychological vulnerabilities may  be enough to facilitate gener-
lized anxiety disorder, considered ‘the phenotypic expression of
igh levels of neuroticism’ and depression, considered “the expres-
ion of high levels of neuroticism coupled with a low degree of
ositive affect” ; however, they indicate other disorders would be
ependent on learning involving more focused fearful responses
o stimuli. Barlow, Ellard et al. (2014) conclude, in line with other
esearchers (e.g., Gray and McNaughton, 2003; Kagan & Snidman,
004), that BIS activation and neurotic temperament is moderated
n part by environmental experiences, with particular emphasis on
arly experiences with uncertainty impacting genetic expressions.
.3. Tripartite and Integrative Hierarchical Models of anxiety and
epression
The Tripartite and Integrative Hierarchical Models (Clark &
atson, 1991; Mineka et al., 1998) are congruent with the Cog-
itive and Triple Vulnerability Models; however, the models were
esigned to explain the clinically apparent overlap between anxi-
ty and depression by focusing on shared and speciﬁc underlying
actors. The Tripartite Model posits three critical syndrome dimen-
ions, including general distress (i.e., neuroticism as deﬁned above
y Barlow, Ellard et al., 2014; Clark & Beck, 2010), physiological
yperarousal (i.e., amount of physical tension and arousal–arguably
verlapping with incremental BIS activation; Gray & McNaughton,
003), and anhedonia (i.e., amount of positive affect). The model
escribes various combinations of dimension intensity as under-
ying anxiety, depression, or both. Speciﬁcally, (1) anxiety results
rom high levels of neuroticism coupled with high levels of phys-
ological hyperarousal; (2) depression results from high levels of
egative affect coupled with low levels of positive affect; and (3)
omorbid anxiety and depression results from high levels of neg-
tive affect coupled with high levels of physiological hyperarousal
nd low levels of positive affect. The high levels of neuroticism rep-
esent the shared underlying factor that produces anxiety and/or
epression. The Integrative Hierarchical Model (Mineka et al., 1998)
xtended the Tripartite model in an attempt to integrate com-
onents of Barlow’s models (Barlow, 1991; Barlow, Chorpita, &
urovsky, 1996; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Zinbarg, Barlow, & Brown,
997). The Integrative Hierarchical Model posited the existence of
 transdiagnostic component underlying individual differences inDisorders 39 (2016) 30–43
neuroticism (Mineka et al., 1998) that would be pervasively com-
mon  to mood and anxiety disorders; accordingly, the theoretical
importance for IU, and therein fear of the unknown, to neuroticism
in the Cognitive and Triple Vulnerability Models can be reasonably
extended to the Tripartite and Integrative Models of anxiety and
depression.
7. Fear of the unknown, anxiety, and depression
There is now substantial empirical evidence supporting fear
of the unknown, most commonly measured indirectly using tools
assessing IU, as playing an important foundational role consis-
tent with the models review and synthesized herein. For example,
fear of the unknown has accounted for statistically signiﬁcant
variance in symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder and worry
(e.g., Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004;
Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Koerner & Dugas,
2006; Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010;
Zlomke & Jeter, 2013), but also in symptoms of panic disorder
(Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Carleton, Duranceau et al., 2014; Carleton,
Fetzner, Hackl, & McEvoy, 2013), social anxiety disorder (Boelen
& Reijntjes, 2009; Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; Carleton,
Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Khawaja & McMahon, 2011; Teale
Sapach, Carleton, Mulvogue, Weeks, & Heimberg, 2015), obsessive
compulsive disorder (Grayson, 2010; Jacoby, Fabricant, Leonard,
Riemann, & Abramowitz, 2013; Khawaja & McMahon, 2011; Lind
& Boschen, 2009; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), post-
traumatic stress disorder (Boelen, 2010; Oglesby, Boffa, Short,
Raines, & Schmidt, in press; Otis, Keane, & Kerns, 2003; White &
Gumley, 2009), health anxiety (Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Fergus,
2013; Fergus & Bardeen, 2013; Fergus & Valentiner, 2011; Kurita,
Garon, Stanton, & Meyerowitz, 2013), separation anxiety (Boelen,
Reijntjes, & Carleton, 2014), and eating disorders (Konstantellou
& Reynolds, 2010; Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011). Fear of
the unknown has also been associated with depression (Meeten,
Dash, Scarlet, & Davey, 2012; Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008;
Miranda & Mennin, 2007; Nelson, Shankman, & Proudﬁt, 2014;
Yook et al., 2010) and personality disorder symptoms (Berenbaum,
Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008; Fergus & Rowatt, 2014).
There have been several broad studies, including a meta-
analysis, that have supported fear of the unknown, typically
measured indirectly using tools assessing IU, as a transdiagnos-
tic factor that is generally comparable across psychopathologies
(Boswell et al., 2013; Carleton et al., 2012; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011;
Hong & Cheung, 2015; McEvoy & Erceg- Hurn, 2016; Mahoney
& McEvoy, 2012c; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013; Norr et al., 2013);
relatedly, researchers have explored IU as a critical component
of hierarchical models (Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005;
Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). Persons with anxiety-
related disorders (i.e., social anxiety, panic disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, obsessive compuslive disorder) or major depres-
sive disorder have reported statistically signiﬁcantly higher fear
of the unknown than undergraduate and community samples
(Carleton et al., 2012). Furthermore, response patterns to ques-
tions assessing IU, and therein fear of the unknown, appear robustly
invariant across persons with anxiety and mood disorders, while
being signiﬁcantly different when comparing clinical and non-
clinical samples (Carleton et al., 2012).
Hong and Cheung (2015) provided further evidence that fear
of the unknown represents a common factor for treating anxiety
and mood disorders with a meta-analytic assessment of vulner-
abilities for depression and anxiety. The meta-analyses included
73 articles examining relationships between cognitive vulnerabil-
ities implicated in depression (i.e., pessimistic inferential style,
dysfunctional attitudes, and ruminative style) and anxiety (i.e.,
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nxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, and fear of neg-
tive evaluation). Their results supported fear of the unknown
s accounting for substantial variance in higher-order constructs,
ut also underscored the primacy of fearing unknowns relative to
ther cognitive vulnerabilities. “Intolerance of uncertainty had the
trongest factor loading—implying that a fundamental fear of the
nknown (Carleton, 2012) may  feature heavily in this common
ore. This element of unknown may  encompass external envi-
onmental uncertainties and threats and an individual’s internally
riented uncertainty about his or her own resources to deal with
uch threats” (Hong & Cheung, 2015; p. 13).
Fear of the unknown has also accounted for variance beyond
nxiety sensitivity (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore
t al., 2010; Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007; Dugas, Gosselin,
 Landouceur, 2001), fear of anxiety (Buhr & Dugas, 2009),
etabeliefs (de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; Dugas et al., 2007),
ositive and negative affectivity (Carleton, Collimore et al., 2010),
nd neuroticism (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Mahoney & McEvoy,
012b). Hierarchical linear regression entry order should begin
ith underlying or precursory constructs or events that are fol-
owed by emergent constructs or subsequent events (Petrocelli,
003). As such, if responses to unknowns are core compo-
ents underlying models of emotion (Scherer, 2013), attachment
Bowlby, 1973), the BIS (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), and neuroti-
ism as described by contemporary models of anxiety (Barlow,
llard et al., 2014; Barlow, Sauer-Zavala et al., 2014; Clark &
eck, 2010), then fear of the unknown and IU could be placed on
he ﬁrst steps (or early steps) of such regressions because they
re lower-order mechanisms underlying increasingly higher order
ears (and/or constructs), which would be placed on later steps, all
f which underlie one of more emergent higher-order factors (i.e.,
euroticism), which would be placed on even higher steps. In con-
rast, if the contemporary deﬁnition of neuroticism is interpreted
uch that it is equated entirely with fearful responses to unknowns
s described herein, that equivocality would need to be explicated
n a subsequent review.
. Fear of the unknown as distinct
Reiss and McNally (1985) may  have been the ﬁrst to take up
peilberger’s (1972) suggestion that anxiety researchers need to
dentify basic and distinct components of anxiety. To that end, Reiss
nd McNally (1985) proffered an expectancy model of fear, anxiety,
nd panic built on initial behaviourist models (e.g., Rachman, 1977),
ut focused on anticipated consequences, which remains congru-
nt with the Cognitive Model (Clark and Beck, 2010). In 1991, Reiss
lariﬁed and reﬁned the expectancy model as using a downward
rrow technique to argue the existence of one or more fundamental
ears that are rationally related to more common fears but unre-
ated to each other. Fears of snakes, heights, and anxiety were all
sed as examples of common fears rationally related by the more
undamental fear of panic symptoms, which Riess described as anx-
ety sensitivity. He argued a rational person would not say they fear
eights because they fear snakes, but because heights may  cause
eared panic symptoms. Reiss’ (1991) approach to identifying fun-
amental fears was further detailed and summarized by Taylor
1993) as follows: “Reiss (1991), and personal communication,
une, 1991) used two criteria to deﬁne these fears as fundamen-
al; (1) they are fears of inherently noxious [aversive] stimuli, and
2) other, ‘common’ fears can be logically reduced to them (p. 289)”.
he revised expectancy theory posited a hierarchical structure for
ears that placed anxiety sensitivity, the fear of negative evalua-
ion, and fears of illness or injury as distinct elements underlying
ll other fears and anxiety (Taylor, 1993).Disorders 39 (2016) 30–43 37
Anxiety sensitivity was described as the propensity to catas-
trophically appraise the symptoms or sensations related to anxiety
(e.g., increased heart rate, palpitations, trembling; Reiss & McNally,
1985; Taylor, 1993, 1999). Anxiety sensitivity focuses on fearing
unrealized or potential consequences associated with the sensa-
tions of anxiety, rather than the anxious state itself (Taylor, 1993,
1999; Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992). Fear of negative evaluation
was described as the propensity to fear being evaluated negatively
by others (Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Leary, 1983). Illness
or injury sensitivity was  described as the propensity to fear expe-
riencing physical harm and the associated consequences (Carleton,
Asmundson, & Taylor, 2005; Mounce, Keogh, & Eccleston, 2010;
Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986; Taylor, 1993). Reiss (1991,
1997) argued that the fundamental fears, in conjunction with a
history of fearful responding, produce neuroticism or trait anxiety
(Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1993; Reiss, 1991, 1997). Researchers
have subsequently argued that fear of pain (Carleton, Abrams,
Asmundson, Antony, & McCabe, 2009) and IU may both be distinct
and fundamental fears (Carleton, 2012).
A full discussion distinguishing IU from each of the other puta-
tive fundamental fears is beyond the scope of the current review
and synthesis. In short, each of the other fears takes a speciﬁc object,
whereas fear of the unknown by deﬁnition involves the absence of
a speciﬁc object. That said, as argued previously (Carleton, 2012;
Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007), the anxiety – not the fear – associ-
ated with each of the fundamental fears depends almost entirely on
the presence of at least one unknown and concordant BIS activation
because of that unknown. For example, a somatic sensation (e.g.,
chest pain) that a person knows with sufﬁcient certainty cannot
lead directly or indirectly to any other aversive consequence may
be uncomfortable, but is unlikely to cause anxiety; by contrast, if a
person knows with sufﬁcient certainty that the sensation will lead
directly or indirectly to another aversive consequence, the anxiety
will refer to the other aversive consequence, but not the sensation
(Carleton, 2012; Carleton, Sharpe et al., 2007).
Previous theoretical and psychometric research has provided
initial support for the independence of each fundamental fear from
each of the other fundamental fears (e.g., Carleton, Thibodeau,
Osborne, Taylor, & Asmundson, 2014; Taylor, 1993), from neuroti-
cism or trait anxiety (e.g., Cornwell, Johnson, Berardi, & Grillon,
2006; Muris, Vlaeyen, & Meesters, 2001; Vancleef, Peters, Roelofs,
& Asmundson, 2006), and from negative affect (e.g., Thibodeau,
Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2012); however, research has
also demonstrated correlations between the fundamental fears
ranging from 0.24 to 0.76, indicating important levels of shared
variance (e.g., Carleton, Thibodeau et al., 2014; Thibodeau et al.,
2012).
9. Fear of the unknown and distress tolerance
Given the proposed deﬁnitions for fear of the unknown and IU, a
brief comment on the relationship with distress tolerance appears
warranted. “Distress tolerance is deﬁned as the capacity to expe-
rience and withstand negative emotional states” (Simons & Gaher,
2005; p. 83). The authors describe the construct as a higher-order
meta-cognitive construct associated with emotion regulation. Dis-
tress tolerance has been associated with several anxiety disorders
(Leyro, Zvolensky, & Bernstein, 2010) and is generally thought to
be a lower-order factor distinct from, but associated with func-
tioning at a comparable level to, anxiety sensitivity (Bernstein,
Zvolensky, Vujanovic, & Moos, 2009). IU is considered to be a lower-
order construct that is speciﬁc to uncertainty and contributes
to a broader higher-order construct that is distress tolerance
(Zvolensky, Vujanovic, Bernstein, & Leyro, 2010). Accordingly, the
contemporary theories for distress tolerance appear entirely con-
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ruent with the proposed deﬁnitions and theoretical bases for fear
f the unknown and IU. Recent evidence implicates IU as the most
rominent lower-order factor underlying the higher-order distress
olerance construct (Bardeen, Fergus, & Orcutt, 2013). Assuming
hat relationship is robust, fear of the unknown may  directly and
ndirectly undermine distress tolerance, making reductions in fear
f the unknown and IU important goals for increasing distress tol-
rance in general. Evidence for such a proposition has recently been
rovided in a study exploring distress tolerance, anxiety sensitivity,
nd IU with patients who had a variety of anxiety-related disorders
Laposa, Collimore, Hawley, & Rector, 2015). Overall, the existing
heories and evidence suggests an important relationship between
U and distress tolerance, both of which appear associated with
nxiety sensitivity and psychopathology.
0. Fear of the unknown and measurement
Pending broad acceptance of the proposed delineations between
ear of the unknown, IU, and expected consequences, as well as the
ognitive and behavioural responses thereafter, researchers may
eneﬁt from developing distinguishing measures. There are sev-
ral measures of IU that implicitly assess fear of the unknown;
or example, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al.,
994), the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale short form (IUS-12;
arleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007), the Intolerance of Uncer-
ainty Index (IUI; Carleton, Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010; Gosselin
t al., 2008), a situation speciﬁc version of the Intolerance of Uncer-
ainty Scale short form (IUS-SS; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012b), and
 measure of IU with disorder-speciﬁc language (DSIU; Thibodeau
t al., 2015). There are also at least two measures designed to assess
U in children (Comer et al., 2009; Rodgers et al., 2012), which
hould facilitate researching IU in youth. Across all of the measures,
any of the items very reasonably focus on uncertainty, with some
ssessing IU generally (e.g., the IUS and IUS-12), others distinguish-
ng what might be called trait IU items from the associated cognitive
nd behavioural responses (e.g., IUI), others focusing on IU within
ituationally speciﬁc contexts (e.g., the IUS-SS), and others within
peciﬁc symptom categories (e.g., DSIU); however, none explic-
tly assess fearing the unknown. Future theorists and researchers
hould consider whether the constructs can and should be dis-
inguished with separate measures. Regardless, more research is
eeded assessing behavioural correlates of self-reported levels for
earing the unknown and IU.
1. Fear of the unknown and treatment
Clark and Beck (2010) emphasize the importance of reducing
earful responses to unknowns in describing the focus of ther-
py for reducing anxiety-related pathology. “Cognitive therapy
ocuses on helping clients recalibrate exaggerated threat appraisals
nd increase their tolerance for risk and uncertainty related to
heir anxious concerns” (p. 37). “Increasing self-conﬁdence to deal
ith threat and uncertainty is an important objective of cogni-
ive therapy for anxiety” (p. 38). Carleton (2012) argued further
hat, effectively, all therapies involve attempts to mitigate fear of
he unknown; speciﬁcally, catastrophic misperceptions resulting
rom absent information can be corrected; realistic threats can be
inimized, managed, or removed; uncertainty can be minimized;
ertainty regarding coping can be increased; or the ability to toler-
te uncertainty can be increased. Therapies designed “to remove
hreats, increase certainty, and create coping capacity, all facili-
ate a sense of agency – illusory or otherwise – thereby reducing
linically-signiﬁcant symptoms of anxiety (and probably depres-
ion). Increasing tolerance for uncertainty, while potentially more
hallenging, may  well provide the most pervasive beneﬁts” (p.Disorders 39 (2016) 30–43
942). There is room for debate as to whether therapy reduces fear
of the unknown or increases tolerance for uncertainty; neverthe-
less, there is substantial evidence that changing interactions with
unknowns has therapeutic value.
Perhaps the earliest and most recognized dedicated treatment
protocol for reducing fear of the unknown was designed by Dugas
and Ladouceur (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur, Dugas et al.,
2000). The treatment is described as speciﬁc to IU and effec-
tive for reducing generalized anxiety disorder symptoms (Cuijpers
et al., 2014; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas & Robichaud, 2007;
Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013; Ladouceur, Dugas et al.,
2000), but also produces changes within broader constructs, such
as neuroticism (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski,
2012; Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas,
2000). Similar reductions have been evidenced using acceptance
based behavioural therapies to target IU for generalized anxiety
disorder symptoms (Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer,
& Orsillo, 2011).
Treatments targeting IU have also produced reductions beyond
generalized anxiety disorder symptoms. For example, Hewitt, Egan
and Rees (2009) have used the IU section from Dugas and Robichaud
(2007) to successfully reduce symptoms of social anxiety in a single
patient trial. Similarly, Mahoney and McEvoy (2012a) provided a 7-
week cognitive behavioural group therapy for persons with social
anxiety disorder. The therapy included teaching participants to tol-
erate uncertainty before, during, and after social situations. The
importance of reducing IU was emphasized throughout treatment,
with behavioral experiments framed as tests that (1) examined
if feared outcomes occurred, and (2) served as opportunities to
practice tolerating not knowing how participants were judged.
Reductions in IU predicted subsequent reductions in social anxiety
symptoms, implicating a causal relationship in line with propo-
sitions from the current review and synthesis. Recently, McEvoy
and Erceg-Hurn (2016) demonstrated again that reductions in IU
were critically associated with changes in symptoms of social
anxiety and generalized anxiety, further supporting the transdi-
agnostic importance of IU for treatment. Researchers have also
compared metacognitive therapy to Dugas and Robichaud’s (2007)
IU- focused therapy (van der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen,
2012); both treatments reduced IU and generalized anxiety dis-
order symptoms, with van der Heiden’s demonstrating beneﬁts
relative to a delayed treatment condition, therein further evidenc-
ing the importance of IU to generalized anxiety disorder and the
capacity of targeting IU for reducing symptoms.
Extending existing research on IU to support transdiagnos-
tic treatments, per Carleton’s (2012) recommendation, will likely
require including speciﬁc, explicit, elements for mitigating IU and
fear of the unknown that build on the well-established work of
Dugas and colleagues (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Dugas et al., 2012;
Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000; Ladouceur, Gosselin et al., 2000),
among others. Boswell et al. (2013) have provided evidence to
support Carleton’s (2012) proposition that reducing fear of the
unknown or increasing tolerance for uncertainty represents a com-
mon  factor for treating anxiety and mood disorders. The Uniﬁed
Protocol for the Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders
(Barlow et al., 2011) has been suggested to be “particularly well-
suited to address a shared feature such as IU, due to the treatment’s
focus on commonly employed experiential control strategies that
have been linked with this dispositional characteristic (e.g., worry,
ritualistic behavior, rumination, safety signals), as well as identiﬁ-
cation of and exposure to situations that are avoided because they
may  trigger experiences of uncertainty (e.g., situations that may
elicit panic sensations)” (Boswell et al., 2013). Patients with various
diagnosed disorders (i.e., generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, or
multiple diagnoses) received the treatment in a 16-week random-
xiety 
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zed control trial (Farchione et al., 2012). The treatment produced
ubstantial reductions in symptoms (Farchione et al., 2012), which
 subsequent analysis associated with signiﬁcant decreases in IU
Boswell et al., 2013). Such research provides important initial evi-
ence underscoring IU and, by extension, fear of the unknown as
ausally critical for psychopathology.
Perhaps most recently, Einstein (2014) reviewed related treat-
ent models (including the aforementioned work by Dugas and
olleagues), proffering thereafter a transdiagnostic model that
xplicitly focused on IU as part of treatment. Einstein’s review offers
otential avenues for targeting IU as a transdiagnostic construct
ithin several disorder-speciﬁc contexts. The current review and
ynthesis with construct delineations should help to inform the
ngoing development of all such transdiagnostic treatment mod-
ls, as well as broader models of psychopathology, personality, and
sychology.
2. Summary
The current review and synthesis extends previous work with
ear of the unknown and IU in several critical ways. First, key ele-
ents were deﬁned and fear of the unknown was distinguished
rom related constructs, particularly IU (see Figs. 1 and 2). Second,
ear of the unknown and IU were contextualized within contempo-
ary models of emotion, attachment, inhibition, and neuroticism.
hird, contemporary research on the relationship between IU –
nd by proxy fear of the unknown – and symptoms of anxiety and
epression was highlighted.
An unknown is the perceived absence of information at any level
f consciousness or processing. Fear of the unknown is an individ-
al’s propensity to experience fear caused by the perceived absence
f information at any level of consciousness or point of processing.
U describes an individual’s incapacity to endure the aversive (i.e.,
earful) response triggered by the perception of one or more salient
r key unknowns and sustained by the associated perception of
ncertainty.
Contemporary appraisal theories of emotion emphasize the
mportance of identifying and perceiving unknowns, which occurs
cross each level of emotion processing from low-level neural sub-
trates to conceptual cortical areas (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012;
cherer, 2009, 2013). Accordingly, a response bias to unknowns
ould be a deﬁning characteristic for emotions, the aggregate of
hich would deﬁne affective dispositions (Scherer and Brosch,
009). Attachment research has long underscored the critical role
f unknowns in developing secure attachment (Ainsworth & Bell,
970; Bowlby, 1973) and inﬂuencing temperament (Colonnesi
t al., 2011; Degnan & Fox, 2007; Lewis-Morrarty et al., in
ress; Madigan et al., 2013). The BIS describes neurobiological
oundations of fear and anxiety as activated by unknowns per-
eived as anxiety-provoking “sources of potential danger” (Gray &
cNaughton, 2003; p. 53). Clark and Beck (2010) implicate fear
f the unknown and IU as basic cognitive processes underlying
ll anxiety disorders. Similarly, Barlow and colleagues implicate
nknowns and IU as causally inﬂuencing anxiety (Boswell et al.,
013).
Across the empirically supported models there appears to be
onceptual support for Carleton’s (2012) summary proposition
hat fear of the unknown may  represent a “logically necessary
 . . transdiagnostic dispositional risk factor for clinically signiﬁ-
ant anxiety and depression” (p. 943). There is also substantial
nd growing empirical support that IU, and by extension fear of
he unknown, plays a critical and causal transdiagnostic role for
nxiety and depression (Hong & Cheung, 2015). Going forward,
ear of the unknown and IU should be explored as explicit, rather
han implicit, components of psychoeducation and explicit targetsDisorders 39 (2016) 30–43 39
for exposure and cognitive restructuring. If fear of the unknown
is the driving element for IU and therein anxiety, understanding
and inﬂuencing that fear will have broad reaching theoretical and
practical utility for predicting and modifying individual differences,
behaviours, and transdiagnostic symptoms. As such, fear of the
unknown may  be a, or possibly the, fundamental fear, representing
an Archimedean lever for human psychology.
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